



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI 
ABERDEEN DIVISION 
 
THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI,  
ex rel. JIM HOOD, Attorney General for the 







Civil Action No. ________ 
 
 
NOTICE OF REMOVAL 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant Google LLC (“Google”) files this Notice of 
Removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), removing the action commenced against Google by 
Plaintiff the State of Mississippi ex rel. Jim Hood (the “Attorney General”) from the Chancery 
Court of Lowndes County, Mississippi, to the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Mississippi.  The Court has original jurisdiction over certain claims in this action 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining 
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Since 2007, Google has offered a collection of online services known as G Suite 
for Education (“GSFE”) to schools free of charge.  Any school that is interested in GSFE may 
sign up and create accounts for its students and educators, who will have access to free email 
accounts, scheduling and collaboration tools, and cloud storage through the GSFE “Core 
Services”: Gmail, Calendar, Contacts, Drive, Docs, Forms, Groups, Sheets, Slides, 
Talk/Hangouts, Vault, Chrome Sync, and Google Classroom.  Schools also may allow their 
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account holders to use their GSFE accounts to access other Google services generally available 
for consumers, such as Maps, YouTube, Books, and News (“Additional Services”).  GSFE 
requires schools to obtain parental consent for the collection and use of personal information in 
the Additional Services before allowing any users under the age of 18 to use those services. 
2. Schools across Mississippi have welcomed GSFE into their classrooms, taking 
advantage of its powerful tools to enhance productivity and build curricula for the twenty-first 
century.   
3. Despite the absence of a single complaint from any Mississippi school or student, 
the Attorney General filed a lawsuit against Google on January 13, 2017, alleging violations of 
Mississippi’s consumer protection statutes based on alleged misrepresentations to GSFE 
customers (the “Original Complaint”). 
4. The Original Complaint relied on representations made by Google in four 
documents: (1) the K-12 School Service Provider Pledge to Safeguard Student Privacy (the 
“Pledge”), a voluntary set of principles established by the Future of Privacy Forum and the 
Software & Information Industry Association to which Google has been committed since 
January 2015; (2) the GSFE Agreement, the contract between schools and Google allowing 
access to GSFE; (3) the Data Processing Amendment (“DPA”), an optional addendum to the 
GSFE Agreement; and (4) the GSFE Privacy Notice, which provides information about privacy 
practices that are specific to GSFE.   
5. The Original Complaint generally alleged that Google’s practices in the 
Additional Services were not consistent with the representations in these four documents.  The 
Original Complaint expressly disclaimed reliance on federal law and invoked no federal statutes.    
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6. Google disputed the allegations in the Original Complaint, including by filing a 
motion for partial summary judgment on July 30, 2019.   
7. The motion for partial summary judgment argued that the Original Complaint 
misstated Google’s representations in the Pledge, the GSFE Agreement, and the DPA.  The plain 
language of these representations establishes that they apply only in the Core Services.  The 
Original Complaint, however, asserted that these representations were violated by Google’s 
collection and use of data in the Additional Services.  The Original Complaint therefore sought to 
hold Google liable for breaching commitments that it never made. 
8. Two days before Google’s motion for partial summary judgment had been set to 
be heard, the Attorney General filed a First Amended Complaint (the “Amended Complaint” or 
“FAC”) on December 3, 2019.   
9. In the Amended Complaint, the Attorney General adds a new set of allegations 
not found in the Original Complaint:  that Google’s provision of GSFE to schools allegedly 
violates the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6501 et seq. (“COPPA”).  See 
FAC Section C (“Section C”), ¶¶ 87-104. 
10. Enacted by Congress in 1998, COPPA creates a federal framework requiring 
parental consent in certain circumstances before collecting personal information from children 
known to be under the age of 13.   COPPA does not create a private right of action.  Instead, 
COPPA authorizes the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) to issue regulations and provides that 
violation of those regulations constitutes an unfair or deceptive trade practice under Section 5 of 
the FTC Act, which the FTC enforces.  See 15 U.S.C. § 6502.  COPPA also provides a right to 
state attorneys general to enforce COPPA and bring actions related to noncompliance with its 
provisions, so long as they do so in federal court, provide the FTC notice and the opportunity to 
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intervene, and defer to any pending FTC enforcement action.  Id. § 6504.  In such actions, state 
attorneys general may obtain injunctive relief, damages, restitution, “other compensation on 
behalf of [state residents],” and “such other relief as the court may consider to be appropriate.”  
Id.  COPPA preempts inconsistent state law.  See 15 U.S.C. § 6502(d).  
GROUNDS FOR REMOVAL 
11. Federal jurisdiction is proper here for two reasons, each of which is sufficient by 
itself to support removal of this action. 
12. First, federal jurisdiction exists under the doctrine of complete preemption, which 
applies where Congress creates a federal cause of action and “intended the federal cause of 
action to be the exclusive cause of action for the particular claims asserted under state law.”  
Elam v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 635 F.3d 796, 803 (5th Cir. 2011).  Congress did so here, 
authorizing unfair and deceptive practice claims predicated on COPPA violations only in federal 
court.   
13. Second, in the alternative, even if COPPA does not completely preempt the 
purported state law claims alleged in Section C, federal jurisdiction still exists under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 (and thus removal is proper) because the claims in Section C necessarily raise important 
questions of federal law.  See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 
545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005).  Section C asks the Court to declare that Google’s representations that 
GSFE complies with COPPA are not true; that requires deciding what obligations COPPA—a 
federal law—imposes on Google, and whether Google met those obligations.   
 
I. COPPA CREATES AN EXCLUSIVE FEDERAL CAUSE OF ACTION  
14. COPPA established a uniform national framework for regulating the online 
collection and use of personal information from people known to be under age 13.  COPPA 
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authorizes the FTC to issue enforcing regulations, 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b), and encourages self-
regulation through a statutorily mandated “safe harbor” program under which compliance with 
certain industry guidelines is deemed to satisfy the regulatory requirements.  Id. § 6503. 
15. COPPA provides no private right of action.  And COPPA precludes the states 
from altering the rules related to collection of information from children online, expressly 
preempting any state law that would “impose any liability for commercial activities or actions … 
that is inconsistent with the treatment of those activities or actions” under COPPA.  15 U.S.C. 
§ 6502(d).     
16. COPPA creates a cause of action for state attorneys general.  First, a state 
attorney general may bring an action to “enforce compliance with the [FTC’s COPPA] 
regulation.”  15 U.S.C. § 6504(a)(1)(B).  Second, a state attorney general may bring an action for 
injunctive relief, damages or restitution “[i]n any case” where the attorney general “has reason to 
believe that an interest of the residents of that State has been or is threatened or adversely 
affected by the engagement of any person in a practice that violates” the FTC COPPA regulation.  
Id. § 6504(a)(1) (emphasis added).  Such an action may be brought “in a district court of the 
United States.”  Id. 
17. To ensure that the federal interest in COPPA enforcement is respected, state 
attorneys general are required to notify the FTC before or upon filing a complaint alleging 
COPPA violations, and the FTC has a statutory right to intervene and be heard, including by 
filing a petition for appeal of any judgment.  15 U.S.C. § 6504(a)(2), (b).  States also may not 
bring actions alleging COPPA violations against any defendant named in an FTC enforcement 
action during the pendency of the FTC action.  Id. § 6504(d). 
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18. COPPA lists various state-law powers of attorneys general that COPPA does not 
restrict:  to conduct investigations, administer oaths, or subpoena witnesses or documents.  
15 U.S.C. § 6504(c).  This list of retained powers does not reserve to state attorneys general the 
power to bring actions under state law or in state court predicated on alleged COPPA violations.   
19. Section C repeatedly claims that the interests of Mississippi residents are, in the 
words of COPPA, “adversely affected” by Google’s alleged engagement in practices that violate 
COPPA.  See, e.g., FAC ¶ 95 (“Google neither provides required COPPA notices nor allows 
Mississippi schools to prevent further use or online collection of Mississippi children’s data.”); ¶ 
99 (“Nowhere does Google even attempt to comply with COPPA, and nowhere does it require 
any Mississippi school to obtain COPPA parental consent on behalf of Google.”) (emphasis in 
original); ¶ 101 (“Google collects and retains student data in violation of COPPA.”).  
20. The Amended Complaint characterizes these claims as arising under state law—
specifically the Mississippi Consumer Protection Act, Miss. Code Ann. § 75-24-9.  But how the 
Attorney General chooses to describe its claims does not control the jurisdictional question.  The 
“complete preemption” doctrine is an “exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule.”  Elam, 635 
F. 3d at 803 (emphasis added).  Plaintiffs cannot avoid complete preemption simply by insisting 
they do not intend to bring a federal claim.  Rather, complete preemption “arises when Congress 
‘so completely preempt[s] a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of 
claims is necessarily federal in character.’”  Id.  In that instance, “what otherwise appears as 
merely a state law claim is converted to a claim ‘arising under’ federal law for jurisdictional 
purposes.”  Id.   
21. Complete preemption exists where “(1) the statute contains a civil enforcement 
provision that creates a cause of action that both replaces and protects the analogous area of state 
Case: 1:19-cv-00220-SA-DAS Doc #: 1 Filed: 12/04/19 6 of 13 PageID #: 6
  
7 
law; (2) there is a specific jurisdictional grant to the federal courts for enforcement of the right; 
… [and (3)] Congress intended the federal cause of action to be exclusive.”  Hoskins v. Bekins 
Van Lines, 343 F.3d 769, 775 (5th Cir. 2003). 
22. All three of these requirements are met here.  COPPA expressly creates a civil 
cause of action that protects state interests related to COPPA compliance, 15 U.S.C. § 6504, and 
explicitly preempts state law, id. § 6502(d).  COPPA grants the federal courts jurisdiction to hear 
claims brought by state attorneys general related to COPPA.  Id. § 6504(a).  And Congress 
intended that federal jurisdiction be exclusive, as shown by the statute’s reserving to state 
attorneys general the power to investigate under state law, but not reserving to state attorneys 
general the power to bring claims in state court. Id. § 6504(c).  See Manigault-Johnson v. 
Google, LLC, 2019 WL 3006646, at *6 (D.S.C. Mar. 31, 2019) (“[I]t appears to the Court that 
Plaintiffs seek to use the vehicle of state law to privately enforce the provisions of COPPA, 
which Congress clearly intended to preclude when it included an express preemption clause in 
COPPA….”). 
23. COPPA therefore completely preempts state law claims predicated on alleged 
non-compliance with COPPA.  The purported state law claims in Section C are plainly 
predicated on alleged non-compliance with COPPA; Section C repeatedly alleges that Google 
claimed to comply with COPPA, but did not.  These claims thus arise under federal law and 
provide a proper basis for removal. 
24. This is true even though the Attorney General characterizes his COPPA claims as 
misrepresentation claims.  See FAC ¶ 91 (“Google’s affirmative statements that its conduct 
complies with COPPA are false because it never obtains parental consent for activities unrelated 
to educational and/or school purposes”); FAC ¶ 103 (“Google falsely claims it is COPPA 
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compliant while it uses and/or combines all data of Mississippi students under 13, from one 
internet service to another, or when they access an Additional Service while using their G SUITE 
accounts.”).  The labels affixed to claims do not control the preemption analysis.  See Aetna 
Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 214 (2004) (“distinguishing between pre-empted and non-
pre-empted claims based on the particular label affixed to them would ‘elevate form over 
substance’”). 
25. The federal cause of action COPPA creates for state attorneys general is broad 
enough to include an allegedly false claim of COPPA compliance.  After all, a claim that a 
website has misrepresented its compliance with COPPA’s regulations is a claim that, in the 
words of COPPA, “an interest” of a state’s residents (in not being subjected to unfair or 
deceptive practices) has been “threatened or adversely affected” by practices that violate the 
FTC’s COPPA regulations.   
26. Additionally, a claimed misrepresentation about compliance with COPPA has no 
independent substance; proving the representation false depends entirely on showing violation of 
some legal duty created by COPPA.  To treat such a claim as outside COPPA’s preemptive reach 
would eviscerate Congress’ carefully constructed scheme that (a) bars private rights of action, 
and (b) channels state attorney general actions into federal court.  In analogous circumstances, 
courts have held that ERISA completely preempts purported state law tort claims that are not 
“entirely independent” of the duties created by ERISA.  See, e.g., Davila, 542 U.S. at 213.  The 
same is true here.  The claims set forth in Section C do not rely on a duty “entirely independent” 
of COPPA and are thus completely preempted by COPPA.1 
 
1  The claims at issue here are thus quite unlike those raised in In re Nickelodeon Consumer 
Privacy Litigation, 827 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2016).  Plaintiffs’ intrusion upon seclusion claim there 
was not preempted because it “rest[ed] on common-law duties,” not on COPPA.  Id. at 292.  
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27.  This action therefore may properly be removed to federal court.  
II. REMOVAL IS WARRANTED BECAUSE THE RELIEF SOUGHT DEPENDS ON 
RESOLUTION OF A SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF FEDERAL LAW 
28. There is another, independently sufficient basis for federal jurisdiction. 
29. Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over a state law claim if an issue 
of federal law is “(1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of 
resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.”  
Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258 (2013).  The claims asserted in Section C of the FAC satisfy 
all four elements of this test. 
30. Necessarily Raised: As discussed above, the COPPA allegations in Section C of 
the FAC necessarily raise issues of federal law.  Section C asks the Court to declare that certain 
statements Google allegedly made about complying with COPPA are false, and therefore each 
constitute “separate violations of Mississippi law.” FAC VII ¶ 3.  A court cannot evaluate 
whether Google’s alleged representations of compliance with COPPA are false without 
determining what COPPA requires, and whether or not Google’s conduct complied with those 
requirements.   
31. Actually Disputed: Issues of federal law also are actually disputed.  Google does 
not agree with the Attorney General’s central legal allegations in Section C, including that 
reliance on a school to obtain consent would violate COPPA.  See FAC ¶ 100. 
32. Substantial: “The substantiality inquiry … looks … to the importance of the 
issue to the federal system as a whole.”  Gunn, 568 U.S. at 260.  There are several reasons why 
the COPPA issues at stake in the Amended Complaint are important to the federal system.   
 
Here, by contrast, the Attorney General’s claims in Section C rest entirely on Google’s alleged 
noncompliance with COPPA.  Indeed, the Attorney General cannot prevail on the claims 
asserted in Section C without demonstrating a COPPA violation. 
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33. First, Congress has indicated a strong federal interest in COPPA issues being 
resolved in federal court with the potential participation of the FTC.   As discussed above, 
COPPA requires such actions to be brought in federal court, requires giving the FTC notice and 
the opportunity to intervene, and forbids state attorneys general to bring a case at all if an FTC 
action is pending.   
34. Second, the Amended Complaint raises important issues of federal law that have 
not yet been conclusively determined by federal courts, such as whether and to what extent a 
web operator can rely on a school to obtain parental consent.  See Bd. of Commissioners of Se. 
Louisiana Flood Prot. Auth.-E. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., L.L.C., 850 F.3d 714, 724 (5th 
Cir. 2017) (federal jurisdiction appropriate where “[t]he dispute between the parties does not just 
concern whether Defendants breached duties created by federal law; it concerns whether federal 
law creates such duties”).  The internet operates nationally, and issues like this require a single, 
national resolution.  COPPA’s express preemption provision would be undermined if state courts 
were allowed to develop their own COPPA jurisprudence.   
35. Federal-State Balance: The final factor—the federal/state balance—also weighs 
strongly in favor of federal jurisdiction.  Allowing the COPPA claims in the Amended 
Complaint to be heard in federal court would not disrupt the federal-state balance approved by 
Congress.  As discussed above, Congress explicitly determined that state attorney general actions 
predicated on alleged COPPA violations must be brought in federal court.  It is remanding this 
case to state court that threatens the federal-state balance.  Doing so would raise the prospect of 
fifty different, conflicting determinations of what COPPA requires, which would leave those 
dependent on COPPA—the internet companies who wish to provide services to children, and the 
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parents of those children—without the clear and stable ground rules Congress intended COPPA 
to provide.   
36. For all these reasons, the claims set forth in Section C of the Amended Complaint 
arise under federal law. 
TIMELINESS 
37. Defendants in this action were served with the Amended Complaint on December 
3, 2019, and the case alleged by the Original Complaint was not removable to federal court.  
Accordingly, this petition is timely.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). 
NO WAIVER 
38. Nothing in this Notice of Removal should be interpreted as a waiver or 
relinquishment of Defendant’s rights to assert defenses or objections including, without 
limitation, the defenses of (i) lack of personal jurisdiction; (ii) improper venue and/or forum non 
conveniens; (iii) insufficiency or lack of process or service of process; (iv) improper joinder of 
claims and/or parties; (v) failure to state a claim; (vi) failure to join an indispensable party(ies); 
or (vii) any other procedural or substantive defense available under state or federal law. 
39. If any question arises as to the propriety of the removal of this action, Defendants 
request the opportunity to brief any disputed issues and to present further evidence and oral 
argument in support of their position that this case was properly removed. 
VENUE 
40. Venue is properly laid in this Court as the U.S. district court for the district in 
which the FAC is pending.  28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 
 
 WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests that this Court accept this Notice of 
Removal. 




RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of December, 2019. 
/s/ Fred Krutz                                   /s/ Blake Roberts                                   
FORMAN WATKINS & KRUTZ LLP 
Fred Krutz (MSB No. 4270) 
Daniel J. Mulholland (MSB No. 3643) 
210 East Capitol St., Ste. 2200 
Jackson, Mississippi 39201 
Telephone: (601) 960-8600 
Fax: (601) 960-8613 
fred.krutz@formanwatkins.com 
daniel.mulholland@formanwatkins.com 
WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND                    
DORR LLP 
Blake Roberts (pro hac vice pending) 
1875 Pennsylvania Avenue NW 
Washington, DC 20006 
Telephone: (202) 663-6000 
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Certificate of Service 
 I hereby certify that on December 4, 2019, I electronically filed the foregoing with the 
Clerk of the Court using the ECF system and served the below-listed counsel by electronic mail. 
/s/ Fred Krutz   
 
Don Kilgore  
Jacqueline H. Ray  
Mary Jo Woods  
Office of the Attorney General  
Post Office Box 220  
Jackson, MS 39205  
Telephone: (601) 968-3680  





John W. Kitchens  
Kitchens Law Firm, P.A.  
Post Office Box 799  
Crystal Springs, MS 39059  
Telephone: (601) 892-3067  
Facsimile: (601) 892-3057  
jkitchens@kitchenslaw.net 
 
F. Jerome Tapley 
Hirlye R. “Ryan” Lutz III 
Brett C. Thompson 
Cory Watson, P.C. 
2131 Magnolia Avenue South 
Birmingham, AL 35205 







4004 Texas Boulevard 
Texarkana, Texas 75503 
Telephone: (903) 334-8646 
Facsimile: (903) 334-8645 
srommel@wylyrommel.com 
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